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Localities in developed countries often restrict construction and population growth through regulations
governing land usage, lot sizes, building heights, and frontage requirements. In developing countries,
such policies are less effective because of the existence of unregulated, informal housing markets.
Cities in developing countries that seek to limit in-migration must also discourage entry into informal
housing by providing low levels of public services to this sector.  In this paper, we analyze the causes
of slums, using data from Brazilian urban areas. We develop a model of the decisions that localities
make to affect in-migration and find evidence that localities act strategically. Richer and larger localities
in an urban area reduce provision of water and sewerage connections to the smaller houses in which
poorer migrants would live to discourage the in-migration of these poorer migrants and deflect them
to other localities. We also find that under-servicing smaller houses reduces the population growth
rate of localities. Not only does it reduce the in-migration of low-educated households, it seems that,















In developing countries during periods of rapid urbanization, urban areas often house sig-
ni￿cant portions of their populations in informal housing sectors. From the 1960s through
the 1990s, this was illustrated by the development of favelas and loteamentos in Brazil and
similar types of settlements in other Latin American countries. Today, development of such
settlements is played out in the slums of Sub-Saharan Africa and in the ￿urban villages￿of
Beijing and other Chinese urban areas. Informal housing sectors are usually characterized
by varying degrees of insecurity of tenure, but, perhaps more critically in some contexts,
they tend to be cut o⁄ from basic urban services such as central water and sewerage. This
makes living conditions unpleasant, unhealthy, and expensive.
While unserviced settlements may re￿ ect a failure in governance or the low incomes of
residents, we hypothesize that there is a strategic element involved. Provision of bad living
conditions for migrants is a way for existing residents to discourage in-migration to a local-
ity, particularly of low-income migrants. Indeed, in China today, this strategic component is
articulated as an explicit policy currently adopted by the largest urban areas (Cai (2006)).
Forcing the vast majority of migrants into poorly serviced ￿informal sector￿settlements is
viewed as a key element in restraining rural in-migration to these urban areas overall.1 In
Brazil, there has never existed such an explicit articulation of exclusionary housing policy as
in China. The localities or districts of Brazilian urban areas make much more decentralized
policy decisions that in￿ uence in-migration to their speci￿c localities. Nevertheless, corre-
sponding forces seem to be at work in Brazil. We examine how certain localities within
an urban area in Brazil may act to induce migrants to locate in other localities of the same
urban area￿ providing an element of a ￿race to the bottom￿in terms of servicing migrants.
This limits in-migration to such localities within the urban area; but of course such policies
may also inhibit overall migration to the urban area.
The development of unserviced informal housing sectors has immediate e⁄ects beyond
restraining migration: inequality in living conditions and development of unhealthy neigh-
borhoods with high negative externalities. Poor servicing may a⁄ect the location decisions
of low-skilled migrants to a locality; but the resulting negative externalities may also a⁄ect
the supply of high-skilled labor. These policies have implications for the future as coun-
tries develop and undertake investments to make cities more ￿livable￿ , which will involve
catch-up investments. Building water and sewer infrastructure long after the development
1These areas are informal in the sense that (1) they are under rural governance, even when situated well
within the city limits; (2) the city is not responsible for servicing them; and (3) the migrants do not have
rights of local citizens (rural or urban).
1of dense neighborhoods can be very costly, requiring extensive spatial reconstruction and
recon￿guration of neighborhoods.
To better understand this process, we study Brazil from 1980-2000. While Brazil is
urbanized today, and the north to south movement of people has diminished, local resistance
to in-migration of low-skilled migrants was an important issue in the 1980s, with e⁄ects on
urban growth persisting through the 1990s. By studying Brazil in this time period, we
hope to better understand the forces at work in China and in other urbanizing countries
today. For Brazil, we examine (1) public infrastructure investment behavior in localities in
the 1980s and (2) the impact of such policies on subsequent locality population growth and
social composition in the 1990s. We ￿nd evidence consistent with strategic behavior and
￿nd that such policies a⁄ected population growth rates of localities.
There is an extensive literature on exclusionary policies of local jurisdictions (e.g., the
Tiebout literature, as reviewed in Epple and Nechyba (2004)). Building on this literature,
more recently Gyourko, Mayer, and Sinai (2006) analyze the development in the United
States of what they call ￿superstar￿cities. These are cities typically favored with excellent
natural amenities, where population growth has slowed, the share of the population from
higher income groups is high and increasing over time, and there is ￿excess demand to enter
the city￿as evidenced by rapidly rising housing prices relative to the rest of the nation. The
presumption is that superstar cities impose strict land-use regulations that inhibit further
residential development which, if it occurred, might dissipate the advantages of the high
natural amenities. If high-income consumers have a higher willingness-to-pay per unit of
housing for these amenities, they will outbid lower-income consumers to live in superstar
locations. If the national population is growing over time, superstar cities will become
increasingly relatively richer as they draw from an increasingly smaller upper tail of the
income distribution.
The reasons for exclusion in developing countries have the related strati￿cation and
amenity elements. But there are two key di⁄erences. The ￿rst involves motivation and
setting; the second, a more substantive analytical issue. For the ￿rst, certain urban areas
may not be favored so much by natural amenities but rather by policy initiatives of na-
tional governments in terms of capital market allocations for industry, provision of public
services for incumbent residents, licensing for export, foreign direct investment, imports,
and government investment in state capitalism. The literature makes this point generally
(Ades and Glaeser (1995) and Davis and Henderson (2003)) and then with examples from
Indonesia and China, (Henderson and Kuncoro (1996), Je⁄erson and Singhe (1999), and Au
and Henderson (2006)), as well as Brazil. This favoritism attracts migrants seeking job
opportunities. If in-migration is unfettered, in the end, such favored urban areas become
2￿over-populated￿ , in the sense that migration only ceases when the increased congestion,
living costs, and diminished quality of life from over-population lead to dissipation of the
bene￿ts of national government favoritism.
Not surprisingly, incumbent residents of localities within an urban area may seek to
restrict in-migration to their locality of at least low-income people, to halt this dissipation
process within their locality. Such a situation may represent con￿ icting interests at the local,
state, and national government levels. While localities may want to serve the interests of
incumbent residents by limiting in-migration, national and state government o¢ cials may
have a di⁄erent political agenda, favoring certain urban areas with subsidized investment
and public services such as schooling, implicitly encouraging overall migration to these urban
areas.
Given the desire to exclude, the second di⁄erence in application to developing countries
involves the operation and nature of restrictions. In developed countries, exclusion occurs
through formal market housing restrictions￿ development fees, zoning, and other policy
levers limiting housing development and population density. In many developing countries,
formal housing sector restrictions, rather than halting locality growth as in the United States,
lead to development of an informal sector where such restrictions are ignored, which, unlike
in the United States, is ￿tolerated￿ . By tolerated we mean it is not politically feasible to
halt development of informal settlements and/or institutions are su¢ ciently weak, making
enforcement of a ban on informal settlements impossible. Given formal sector restrictions
are not enough to halt growth, exclusion defaults into informal sector policies, which may
retard the rate of growth.
Brazil has two types of informal sector housing markets. First are favelas, which were
historically created by land invasions of government land or private land often under title
dispute. In principle, such settlements are illegal, both because land use regulations are
evaded and because the housing is on land owned by other parties than the occupier. Second
are loteamentos, where developments do not meet zoning regulations, but are built on legally
acquired land. However, after development, owners cannot obtain land title because the
housing does not meet zoning regulations. Favelas are an early phenomenon, often pictured
in cities such as Rio de Janeiro as a response to in-migration pressure and lack of formal
sector housing.
Loteamentos are a more recent development, supposedly spurred by a national law in 1979
requiring 125 square meters of land as the minimum lot size for any construction (Avila
(2006)). Since only 15% of urban housing units in Brazil are apartments, the law was
aimed at single family homes. A common view is that the law made formal sector housing
una⁄ordable for low- and low-middle income families. Since then, individual localities have
3imposed even stricter minimum lot size requirements. As urban areas expanded after 1979,
a substantial part of the increased housing demand was met by suburban developments that
violated the national zoning law.2
A key aspect is that until the late 1980s and democratization, it was in principle ￿illegal￿
for localities to provide public infrastructure such as central sewer and water connections in
either type of settlement. This gave an opportunistic excuse to deny or limit such provision.
While localities cannot e⁄ectively halt informal sector development, they can contain it by
denying basic public infrastructure services to such neighborhoods, with a twofold impact for
migrants￿ poor living conditions and the need to substitute expensive private alternatives
to public provision of basic services.
Section 2 of the paper discusses data and trends towards exclusion. Section 3 dis-
cusses a conceptual framework to inform econometric speci￿cations. Section 4 analyzes
whether localities in a metropolitan area seem to interact strategically to exclude migrants
and what types of localities are more likely to ￿under-provide￿public infrastructure to mi-
grants. Section 5 estimates the impact of exclusion on locality population growth and
population composition. Section 6 concludes.
2 Urbanization and Public Infrastructure in Brazil
This section provides background information on Brazil relevant to our analysis, both the-
oretical and econometric. First we describe the data and spatial units of analysis. Then
we provide an overview of Brazilian locality and urban area growth, which will help frame
the precise approach and modeling we undertake. Finally we examine data on di⁄erent
dimensions of informality and then turn to the issue of how, in the data, to represent policy
initiatives which are based on exclusionary considerations.
The paper focuses on the post 1980 time period. We look at public service provision
during the 1980 time period, which starts o⁄ as non-democratic. Full democratization
at the national level occurs in 1988, with democratic reforms in subsequent years.3 One
set of reforms removed restrictions on localities providing infrastructure to the informal
sector; another encouraged the regularization of informal housing sectors and the upgrading
of services. Our working presumption is that during the 1980s, exclusionary behavior by
localities in terms of service provision was possible, even though most of our localities had
elected and not military appointed mayors. Elitist dominated cities could legitimately deny
2Indeed although suburban residents are 37.4% of all urban households in major localities, 43.2% of homes
reporting no land title are in suburban areas in 2000.
31988 dates the new constitution. The government moved from military to civilian control in 1985.
4services to the informal sector. However, by the 1990s, following reforms, such strategic
behavior was more problematic.
After looking at service provision in the 1980s, we will examine subsequent locality pop-
ulation composition and growth in the democratic 1990s. This timing turns out to be
convenient in terms of an identi￿cation strategy. The 1980s are the last phase of Brazil￿ s
period of rapid industrialization and urbanization. Industrial development which had fo-
cused on Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro in the post World War II period starts to decentralize
in the late 1970s, with substantial and on-going industrialization of hinterland cities. This
decentralization is facilitated by inter-city investments in transport and telecommunications,
as well as agriculture developments in the north (da Mata, Deichmann, Henderson, Lall, and
Wang (2005)). By the 1990s, these adjustments are largely complete. This change in
urbanization and industrialization patterns re￿ ects a change in the underlying drivers of city
growth from the 1970s to the 1990s. This change in drivers will provide a basis for one
aspect of the instrumental variables approach in Section 5.
2.1 Data
We have Brazilian Population Census data for 1970, 1980, 1991 and 2000. These data
contain a variety of information on housing size, tenure mode, and servicing of houses as
well as basic socioeconomic information covering education, income, family structure, and
migration. We also have information on geographic and ￿scal indicators. While we do
not focus on land-use regulation, we do have retrospective information. A census of local
governments conducted in 1999 and in 2005 [IBGE, Per￿l dos Municipios Brasileiros, 1999
and 2005] indicates whether cities had passed a minimum lot size zoning law in excess of the
national standard of 125 square meters by 1999.4
Local governments in Brazil are municipalities (￿municipios￿ ), units equivalent to United
States counties, with larger urban areas consisting of multiple municipalities. Our unit of
analysis, in principle, is the municipality, as well as 123 urban areas (de￿ned as of 1991)
consisting of either a single municipality or of a collection of municipalities (59 of the 123
cases). Over time, analysis must account for the fact that some initial municipalities split
into more municipalities, and there were some recombinations as well.5 To facilitate over-
time analysis, we combine split municipalities into ￿common denominator￿ones, which we
call localities (informally) or MCAs (Minimum Comparable Areas) more formally (see da
Mata, Deichmann, Henderson, Lall, and Wang (2005)). Most multi-municipality MCAs
4Data are available from IBGE, Per￿l dos Municipios Brasileiros, 1999 and 2005.
5Fiscal transfers from the federal government after 1988 favored creation of new municipios (formulas
included a lump sum component independent of size).
5are dominated by one municipality, where that municipality contains over 85% of the urban
population of the MCA.6 The 123 urban areas are composed of 447 localities (MCAs), which
in 1991, consisted of 659 municipalities. Urban areas are either de￿ned as agglomerations
by the Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), or are single localities with over 75,000
people that are over 75% urbanized in 1991. Since what is urban changes dramatically in
the 447 localities from 1970 to 2000, especially in the suburban localities, we often look at
sub-samples of localities, imposing criteria such as requiring the locality to be at least 50%
urbanized in a given census year.
2.2 Patterns: Urban Growth and Strati￿cation
Our spatial unit of analysis is the locality of an urban area. In making this choice, we
were informed by broad patterns in the data. Urban areas in Brazil experienced ￿parallel
growth￿from 1980￿ 2000, meaning that small and large urban areas grew at about the same
rate, as a number of theories predict (e.g., Black and Henderson (1999) and Gabaix (1999))
and Figure 1a demonstrates. While the dispersion of growth rates is larger for smaller
urban areas in Figure 1a, there is no evidence of ￿convergence￿or relative mean reversion
for urban areas. Urban areas grow overall in parallel, with knowledge accumulation and
improved education levels (da Mata, Deichmann, Henderson, Lall, and Wang (2007)). In
contrast, in Figure 1b, localities within urban areas experience signi￿cant mean reversion:
bigger localities, often central city ones, grow at a slower rate than smaller localities. Note
Figures 1b and 2 distinguish localities in the top 10% by urban population size, center city
localities, localities which are both center cities and in the top 10% by size, and all others.
Overall these di⁄ering growth patterns between urban areas and localities represent two
factors. With population growth in an urban area, old localities ￿￿ll-up￿ and become
crowded, and new localities develop. Second with economic growth, urban areas spread
out and suburbs develop, fueled as well by declining commuting costs with transport im-
provements that make central city locations less valuable. This movement of migrants into
di⁄erent localities within urban areas is the variation we will utilize in empirical work. We
note that in Brazil, as in much of the world, the rich live predominately in the center cities,
and the poor live in the suburbs. Thus, in terms of exclusion, we are thinking of central
6For most of our analyses we restrict our sample to those MCAs that are predominantly urban (have
at least 50% of their population living in urban areas) in 1991 and are located in urban areas with other
MCAs. This leaves a sample of 351 MCAs in 55 urban areas. For this sample, 258 of the 351 MCAs are
comprised of just a single municipio (i.e., there were no recombinations or splits of municipios since 1970).
Another 48 have at least 85% of their population in one ￿dominant￿municipio and another 20 at least 65%
of their population in a ￿dominant￿municipio. For the remaining 25 MCAs, the most populous municipio
has between 20% and 64% of the MCA population.
6cities as well as larger and richer suburbs de￿ ecting migrants and low-income residents into
low-income suburbs.7 These notions are reinforced by the fact that overtime richer localities
have grown richer. In Figure 2, we plot the percent rich in 2000 against the percent rich in
1980. We see that larger localities have improved their share of the rich in general: their
data points lie above the 45-degree line. For example, given that center cities are generally
the largest locality in the urban area, the slope coe¢ cient of 1980 share rich on 2000 share
rich has a slope coe¢ cient for central cities of 1.06, which is signi￿cantly higher than 0.94
for all localities.
2.3 The Informal Sector and Public Infrastructure
An issue is how to identify those living in the informal sector in Brazil (e.g., Dowall (2006);
Biderman (2007)). Studies suggest large portions of the population live in the informal
sector, around 30% for bigger cities, although criteria for informality di⁄er as do estimates.
We summarize the possibilities for de￿ning the informal sector as discussed in the literature.
In the census, there is a question ￿lled out by census takers on whether people live in
￿irregular settlements￿ . Irregularity concerns whether streets are straight or crooked, houses
properly numbered in a neighborhood con￿guration of housing, not whether houses are
serviced or owners have formal title. Thus, irregularity di⁄ers from informality, and less than
5% of households are considered irregular. Economists typically prefer to de￿ne informality
based on ownership rights. In the 1991 and 2000 Census, for home owners, there is also a
question on whether home owners have title to their land. In 1991, about 8% of all urban
households in our urban localities live in owner-occupied housing for which they do not report
land title, which corresponds to about 13-14% of owner-occupiers. Again the number seems
small; the belief is that many households without true title answer yes to having title because
they do not feel insecure about their holdings. Home ownership is easily transferable, even
without formal land ownership; and eviction from favelas is rare. As an example of the
perception of security, in regularization programs to grant land title to those without it,
some participants fail to take the last step (about one day￿ s work) and register their land
tenure once they are able to do so.
A di⁄erent approach is to de￿ne ￿informality￿based on lack of public infrastructure pro-
vision. The literature (Dowall (2006)) suggests a key element is a central water connection,
7Why the di⁄erence in where the rich live compared to the United States? One reason may be that, unlike
in the United States, in most countries, funding for public education occurs at the state or national level.
The rich by suburbanizing cannot form exclusionary ￿clubs￿ o⁄ering independently funded, high-quality
schooling; and thus they may prefer the center city with its lower commuting times to service intensive
central business districts.
7where in 1991, about 14% of urban households overall are not connected. A stronger cri-
terion is to impose ￿full service￿ : electricity (virtually universal in 1991), a central water
connection, and a central sewer connection. In 1991, about 51% of households do not have
full service. For water, lack of a water connection means private alternatives must be used.
Historically in many localities, especially those situated on large water tables, the private
alternative was to dig a well. Today, as water tables are strained with wells running dry for
portions of the year and as population density in suburban localities increases, the private
alternative at the margin for a migrant is to use a public stand pipe (and haul the water
for some distance), subscribe to a water truck service (carros-pipa), or purchase bottled or
bagged water. These are di¢ cult or expensive alternatives.
As a preliminary check that central connections are highly valued, we examine willingness-
to-pay for such services, using simple hedonic regressions for renters in the central cities of
Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. The next section describes how these hedonics ￿t into the
overall conceptual and estimation framework. Hedonic regressions reveal willingness-to-pay
within a locality for infrastructure connections, for those on the margin between choosing a
serviced versus unserviced rental unit. The main results are in Appendix A. The regressions
are for 1980, the one census year in which relevant data on rents and neighborhood location
within the center city are available, so we can use ￿xed e⁄ects to control for neighborhood
characteristics. We ￿nd the marginal consumer is willing-to-pay 12% more for a rental
unit with a central water connection (net of additional premium for indoor plumbing) in
Sao Paulo and 23% in Rio de Janeiro. Renters are willing to pay an additional 20% in Sao
Paulo and 36% in Rio de Janeiro for a unit with central sewer and electricity, in addition
to water. Breaking out the components in Appendix A, there is a very high premium on
electricity (although even in 1980 it is virtually universally available); but central sewer itself
still commands 9% and 18% premium in Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, respectively, over no
connection (with septic systems in those congested cities generating little premium over no
sewerage at all).
In this paper, we focus on the notion of exclusion through lack of servicing, whether land
is reported to have formal title or not and whether housing meets land-use regulations or
not. But how do we represent exclusion through lack of servicing? This is tricky because
in Brazil (unlike China) exclusionary policies cannot target individuals based on personal
characteristics such migration status. They can only target neighborhoods where migrants
are likely to live, recognizing migrants can live where they demand given their incomes and
prices. We start by looking at the evolution and extent of servicing, as a guide to how we
will measure the extent of servicing that migrants are likely to face.
82.4 Provision of Infrastructure Services
Table 1 explores dimensions of servicing. We look at localities that are at least 50% urbanized
by decade, as well as localities that are at least 50% urbanized in 1970 (allowing us to track
service expansion within a constant sample of localities). For those places that have ￿no
service￿in 1970 and are at least 50% urbanized, we track how quickly services expand in the
subsequent decades. For this table, we de￿ne localities that have less than 10% of houses
served as having ￿no service￿ . This allows for error in reporting of servicing (especially in
￿ner categories of types of households) and for situations where only one special neighborhood
of a locality has service for idiosyncratic reasons.
Table 1 shows the rapid expansion in services in urban Brazil over the decades. In 1970,
localities that were at least 50% urbanized provided a connection to a central water system
to 51% of their urban households. By 2000, this number had reached 89%, re￿ ecting growth
along two margins￿ increased servicing within highly urbanized localities and the addition
of localities that were previously less than 50% urbanized. For full servicing, where the
shortfall relative to a water connection is usually just lack of central sewer, in 1970, localities
provided full service to 25% of their urban households, with this number reaching 49% by
2000. The fact that the weighted8 percentage of houses with a central water connection
or with full service is higher than the unweighted percentage suggests that more populous
localities service a greater share of their households.
The second panel of Table 1 shows similar results for a constant sample of 258 localities
that were at least 50% urbanized by 1970. Analyzing now only on one margin￿ of increasing
service but not adding new localities to the sample￿ we see localities dramatically increase
the share of houses to which they provide service, from a mean of 51% in 1970 to 92% by
2000. Finally, in the third panel, we explore the increase in servicing among places that
were at least 50% urbanized but had ￿no service￿in 1970. Within the course of a decade,
from 1970 to 1980, these localities grow from having essentially no houses connected to a
central water system (2%) to having 57% of houses connected. This suggests that localities
can quite rapidly expand their central water systems, and the fact that some houses remain
unserviced even by 1991 and 2000 might re￿ ect a strategic element to servicing.
The ￿fth column of the table shows one factor that will lead us to focus on water provision
rather than full servicing when examining exclusion and its e⁄ects. Central water service
generally exists in most urbanized localities; and the margin we examine is the extent of
its provision within the locality. By 1990, 428 of the 429 urbanized localities have central
8We weight the percentage of houses serviced with a central water connection or with full service by the
urban population of the locality.
9water for at least 10% of the households. However, many localities have absolutely no full
service, meaning no central sewerage. In 2000, 17% of our localities have no such service,
and in 1991 it is 42%. For localities with no full service, it is obviously impossible to analyze
exclusionary behavior in terms of denying full servicing to the informal housing sector.
There are two other reasons we focus on water connections. First, provision of a central
water connection seems to generally be more of a locality decision made by municipality water
authorities or in negotiation with regional authorities, while sewer provision seems more of
a state-level decision. Second, the history of spatial development in a city is a key element
determining central sewer connections, but less so for water. While water connections to
unserviced areas are easy to add using above-ground water connections, sewers require a
major investment and upheaval in terms of digging up streets and even house demolition
to bring service to historically unserviced areas. Many neighborhoods, even richer ones,
without sewer connections continue to rely on private alternatives in septic systems.
The ￿rst panel of Table 1 also explores spatial, housing tenure, and income di⁄erences
in service provision for households in 1991. Suburban areas, with their low population
densities and lower incomes, have poorer servicing than localities in general. In terms of
housing tenure, the vast majority of households that report owning their homes are well
serviced, although the best served category are renters, who live in the core parts of older
cities, which are ￿grandfathered￿with central water and sewer. Not surprisingly, the worst
served are those who report that they do not own the land under their house. Similarly,
those living in rent-free or ceded housing, such as employer provided or temporary squatter
housing, are poorly serviced. In the last rows of the ￿rst panel, we see that low-educated
households, where the household head did not complete primary school, are more poorly
serviced than higher-educated households (where the household head completed at least
primary school). While migrants are more poorly serviced than non-migrants, we try to
control for income e⁄ects by looking at households in the bottom 20% of the national urban
income distribution. Low-income migrants (who moved to the locality in the last 10 years)
are more poorly serviced than low-income non-migrants, although the di⁄erences within
low-income groups are not large. While localities care about the rate of in-migration,
today￿ s migrants are tomorrow￿ s non-migrants. Localities may be concerned about the level
and extent of poor in the population, potentially welcoming higher-income migrants (who
may displace existing lower-income migrants) and discouraging lower-income migrants. In
Section 4, we will look at both growth and population composition outcomes.
While we can cite numbers for servicing of migrants, as noted above, localities cannot
discriminate on the basis of income per se, nor migration status. What localities can do is
not service the houses that most migrants and low-educated households are likely to occupy.
10These tend to be the smallest houses with 1￿ 2 total rooms (in 1970 and 1980) or 1￿ 3 total
rooms (in 1991 and 2000). In 1991, 33% of the migrants in our localities lived in 1￿ 3
room (small) houses and only 12% lived in 7￿ 9 room (large) houses, whereas 18% of non-
migrants lived in small houses and another 18% lived in large houses. For migrants from
rural ureas, 42% lived in small houses and only 7% lived in large houses. Finally, for low-
educated households, 27% lived in small houses and 13% lived in large houses, compared
with 17% and 19%, respectively, for higher-educated households. Targeting the smallest
houses therefore appears to be an e⁄ective mechanism in discriminating against migrants
and low-educated households.
In Table 2, we examine the service levels for small houses likely to be occupied by migrants
and low-educated households: 1￿ 2 rooms in 1980 covering the bottom 14.3% of the house-
size distribution and 1￿ 3 rooms in 2000 covering 16.5% of houses. We compare these with
houses for upper-middle-income households: those with 6￿ 7 rooms in 1980 covering 21.5
% of households (below the top 11% by size), and 7￿ 9 rooms in 2000 covering 19.7% of
households (below the top 6%). Table 2 gives weighted averages for servicing of small versus
large houses. In 1980, only 61% of small houses in our localities had a water connection
while 86% of large houses had a water connection. The relative di⁄erence in full servicing
is even more dramatic: 17% versus 54%. By 1991, the water gap diminishes but is still
noticeable overall, and even more so in individual localities.9 In Sections 3 and 4, we will
use the provision of a public water connection to small houses as our basic ￿exclusionary￿
measure, representing quality of infrastructure faced by incoming residents.
2.5 Land-Use Regulations
In Table 3, as an interesting aside, we examine one aspect of local land-use regulations:
lot-size zoning over and above the national 1979 minimum lot-size law. Most of these local
regulations were passed after democratization in 1988; and our data are from 1999 and 2005
as noted earlier. In Table 3, we list what fraction of signi￿cant size localities (with over
15,000 urban residents) by 1999 had passed a minimum lot-size law in excess of 125 square
meters￿ that is, a minimum lot-size law in excess of the national standard. In column 2,
we look at the ratio of urban households in 2000 that are migrant relative to non-migrant.
We compare these ratios in locally zoned localities￿ those with a more stringent minimum
lot-size law than the national law￿ to those without local zoning. In column 3, we list
the ratio of homeowners without title to those with title for the same groups of localities.
Note more migrants relative to non-migrants and more households without title relative
9The unweighted averages for water in 1991 for small versus large houses are 57% and 89%, respectively.
11to those with title tend to live in areas with minimum lot-sizes in excess of the national
standard. This hints at the endogeneity of regulations: localities that impose stronger
zoning regulations may be those subject to migration pressure. Endogeneity will be critical
in the later identi￿cation of the e⁄ects of servicing on locality growth.
3 Conceptualizing Exclusionary Behavior
This section develops a simple model upon which we base the empirical formulations of
strategic behavior, servicing levels, and population growth. Since the empirical work is
focused on within urban area variation for identi￿cation of e⁄ects, we are not going to focus
on the determination of urban area characteristics. For example, we assume workers in all
localities in an urban area participate in the same overall urban area labor market. Then,
conditional on total urban area size, people￿ s choice of locality within an urban area does not
a⁄ect their wage incomes (although in the empirics we experimented with implicitly allowing
the choice to a⁄ect disposable incomes after commuting costs).
We formulate the basic problem much like the welfare competition literature in the United
States (Wildasin (1991), Brueckner (2000)), where within a region, localities are choosing a
policy tool as they face a potential in￿ ux of migrants. In our case, the policy tool is the
servicing of small houses typically occupied by migrants. The urban area faces a supply
of in-migrants, which will be split across the localities of the urban area depending on the
living conditions in these localities. Localities value better services for these migrants for
either altruistic or externality reasons, which is a force to increase service levels. However,
they would prefer fewer migrants to their own locality, which is a force to reduce service
levels, although, for economic growth reasons, they may want more migrants overall to
the urban area. We start by specifying the preferences and demand functions of migrants
depending on whether they are serviced or not. Then we look at equilibrium in the locality
housing market and equilibrium in the ￿ ow of migrants to the urban area, as well as the
distribution of migrants across localities. Based on this information, the service levels in
other localities, and the characteristics of the own locality￿ s base-resident population, each
locality strategically chooses a level of servicing. We outline a general functional form
model that captures the key aspects and then illustrate a speci￿c version which gives simple
estimating equations.
Migrants have preferences of the form
U = ^ U(x;h;g;b), (1)
12where x is the numeraire good, h is housing, g is the quantity of urban services such as
water, and b is the share of migrants who are serviced, a positive externality for migrants
and residents. The share of migrants served is a policy variable chosen by the locality. The
endogenous number of migrants to the locality is L. All migrants are assumed to live in
the informal housing sector while base-residents live in the formal sector. Based on policy
decisions by the locality, some migrants will live in neighborhoods where the locality publicly
provides a reasonable quality of public services at a unit cost c0 (e.g., the cost of metered
water). Other migrants will live in unserviced neighborhoods, where residents must privately
secure services at a higher unit cost, c (e.g., water purchased from water delivery trucks).
3.1 Equilibrium within the Informal Sector
Migrants residing in serviced neighborhoods have housing demand functions and quasi-
indirect utility functions of the form
h0 = h0(y;p0;c0;b), (2a)
U0 = U0(y;p0;c0;b). (2b)
Disposable income of migrants is y and p0 is the price of housing in serviced neighborhoods.
Those residing in unserviced neighborhoods have, respectively, demand functions for housing
and an indirect utility of the form
h = h(y;p;c;b) (3a)
U = U(y;p;c;b). (3b)
For the same housing price p, U0 > U, given c > c0. To equilibrate utility across the two
types of neighborhoods, p0 > p , and from (2b) and (3b), we have
p0 = p0(p;y;b;c;c0). (4)
Equation (4) underlies the hedonic regressions reported earlier for Sao Paulo and Rio de
Janeiro, examining within locality di⁄erences in relative rents based on type of service.
Across communities, overall di⁄erences in servicing and other conditions will be re￿ ected in
absolute price di⁄erences in both and p0 and p.
Migration to a locality is governed by two equilibrium conditions: demand equals supply
in the locality housing market and utility equalization for all migrants across localities within
13the urban area.
3.1.1 Housing Demand Equals Supply
For the condition of housing demand equaling housing supply, we assume housing supply for
migrants to the informal sector of a locality is given by Hs(A;p) where A describes supply
conditions in the locality, based upon vacant land availability and the rising cost of bringing
extra land into production of housing services. The number of serviced sites in the informal
sector is a policy choice of existing residents, so the supply margin is the unserviced sector
with price p. Hence the supply speci￿cation Hs(A;p). Summing the individual housing
demands of the L0 serviced people (2a) and of the L ￿ L0 unserviced people (3a), using
equation (4) for p0, we have
L(b ￿ h(y;p0;c0;b) + (1 ￿ b) ￿ h(y;p;c;b)) = H
s(A;p), (5a)
b ￿ L0=L. (5b)
In (5b), b ￿ L0=L is the proportion of migrants served, which is the basic policy variable.
3.1.2 Supply of Migrants
The ￿nal piece for internal locality equilibrium in markets for migrants concerns the supply
of migrants to the locality. Localities within an urban area share migrants, whose total
supply is increasing in utility o⁄ered at the margin in the urban area and hence at the
margin for all localities in the urban area (given equalized utility for migrants across the
urban area). Utility rises as the total number of migrants L to the urban area increases,
with an inverse supply function of the form f(L); f0 > 0. Equating utility of the marginal
unserviced migrant in our locality, U = U(y;p;c;b), to this inverse supply, we can solve out
for the locality housing price-level to get
p = p(L;y;c;b). (6)
Substituting for p from (6) into (5a), we get
L = L(b;A;L;y;c0;c). (7)
Using urban area ￿xed e⁄ects (conditioning on L), we will estimate a version of (7), to
show how the ￿policy￿instrument, b, as well as housing supply conditions, A, a⁄ect locality
14population. Although service-level di⁄erences within localities are capitalized into intra-
community di⁄erences in housing prices, locality choice by migrants is a⁄ected by relative
service levels because service levels are an externality. Thus, relative servicing is a policy
instrument for localities to encourage or discourage in-migration. We also note that they
a⁄ect overall housing demand and hence price level within the locality via capitalization and
the proportions of serviced versus unserviced housing (p0 and b versus p and (1 ￿ b) on the
left-hand side of (5a)).
3.2 Equilibrium across Localities within an Urban Area
We now turn to the urban area as a whole in which there are di⁄erent localities, indexed




Lj, where j indexes localities. Given the de￿nition of Li and an equation (7) for
each locality within the urban area, in principle we can solve for a system of equations for
each locality where
Lji = Lji(bi;Ai;yi;c0i;ci), j = 1;:::;ni, (8)
ni is the number of localities in urban area i, bi is the vector of service ratios of localities in
urban area i; and Ai is the vector of land supply endowments for migrants in each locality
in urban area i. Income levels and costs of publicly provided services are indexed by i to
indicate they vary by urban area. Unit costs of services could vary by localities within an
urban area, in which case we have vectors, ci and c0i. Finally, the function is also indexed
since its form will vary with the number of localities, ni.
Given Lji(￿) functions, we can calculate the population response of any locality in an
urban area to a change in another locality￿ s policy variable, bji. Thus, if we are looking at
locality 1, we can calculate @Lji=@b1i;which is essential to assessing strategic responses.
3.3 The Strategic Choice of Servicing for Migrants
Existing local residents of locality 1 of a representative urban area choose b1 to maximize
utility. We use a reduced-form speci￿cation of preferences,
V (y(L);b1;L1;Z1); Vy;Vb1;yL ￿ 0; VL1 < 0. (9)
For the ￿rst argument, we allow more migrants, L, to the overall urban area to increase
incomes of existing urban area residents, y(L). This could re￿ ect scale e⁄ects in urban
15area total employment and/or the labor substitution e⁄ects in production where more low-
skilled migrants raise the productivity of existing high-skilled residents. It is also meant
to capture any urban area level diseconomies, such as generalized congestion on intra-urban
area highways from having more workers in the urban area, although urban area scale e⁄ects
in net here are modelled as positive. For migrants, we ignore these scale economies, although
they are easy to add back in. The second term, where Vb1 > 0, re￿ ects positive externalities
from better servicing of migrants in the locality. However, the third term, where VL1 < 0,
implies that while residents of locality 1 want migrants to the urban area, they do not want
them in their own locality. This could re￿ ect local congestion considerations or simple
prejudices against migrants. Z1 are other characteristics of the locality, such income of
existing residents.
Existing residents choose b1 to maximize (9), holding other localities￿choices of service





@Lji(￿)=@b1) + Vb1(￿) + VL1(￿) @L1i=@b1 = 0, (10)
where the @Lji=@b1￿ s are calculated from equation (8). Using this ￿rst order condition and
equations (8), we can de￿ne
b1i = b1i(b￿1i;Ai;Zi;yi;c0i;ci), (11)
where b￿1i is the vector of service levels in other localities in the urban area. Equation
(11) will be the basis for estimating (1) strategic interactions and (2) how characteristics
of existing localities in￿ uence policy choices. For strategic interactions, by di⁄erentiating
equation (11), we can solve for db1i=dbji, or how locality 1 changes its service levels in response
to a di⁄erent o⁄ering in locality j. This gives a test of strategic interactions per se. But of
greater interest empirically, as suggested in Figures 1b and 2, will be how di⁄erent localities
strategize according to whether they are higher-income versus lower-income or larger versus
smaller.
3.4 A Simple Example
Consider an urban area with two localities, 1 and 2. Assume migrant house size is ￿xed and
invariant to price. In any locality, serviced migrants have utility x + g
￿
0 + b￿, where income
to be spent on x is (y ￿ p0 ￿ c0g0). Serviced migrants choose g0 to maximize utility, so
that g0 = (￿c
￿1
0 )1=(1￿￿). Thus, their quasi-indirect utility function is y ￿p0 +f0 +b￿, where
16f0 ￿ (1￿￿)(￿c
￿1
0 )￿=(1￿￿). Correspondingly, unserviced migrants have utility y ￿p+f +b￿.
Equating utilities, we can solve p0 ￿ p = f0 ￿ f > 0, given c > c0:
Housing supply to the community is given by Ap, where equating that to demand, L, we
know p = LA￿1. Labor supply to the urban area is given by L, so equating utility of the
marginal unserviced migrant, y ￿ p + f + b￿, to L and using p = LA￿1 from local housing
demand equals supply, for locality 1, we have L1 = (y + f)A1 + A1b￿
1 ￿ A1L. Using the
corresponding equation for community 2 and L = L1 + L2, we can solve










as ￿ As=(1 + A1 + A2), s ￿ 1;2.
Suppose an existing resident￿ s utility is given by C + b￿
1 ￿ Z1L
￿
1, ￿ > 1, where the e⁄ect of
immigration to the urban area on incomes is ignored. Maximizing with respect to b1, where
from (8a) we calculate @L1=@b1 and @L2=@b1, we get with rearrangement
b
￿




1 + C1, (11a)
where ￿1 and C1 are locality 1 speci￿c constants (e.g. ￿1 ￿ ￿
1=(1￿￿)a
￿=(1￿￿)
1 (1 + A2)￿=(1￿￿)).
In equation (11a), strategic interactions are positive so there is a ￿race to the bottom￿ , where
if locality 1 lowers service levels, locality 2 follows suit.
It is easy however to construct examples where db1=db2 < 0. Suppose we rewrite existing
residents￿utility as (L1 + L2)" + b￿
1 ￿ Z1L
￿
1. Second, we make the localities symmetrical to
keep the example simple. The ￿rst-order condition yields a"(L1 + L2)"￿1 + ￿b￿￿1 ￿ ￿a(1 +
A)Z1L
￿￿1
1 = 0. To ￿nd db1=db2, we di⁄erentiate totally with respect to b1 and b2 to get
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+ Z1￿(￿ ￿ 1)A(1 + A)L
￿￿2
1 ],
where t1 is a collection of terms that must be negative from the second-order condition on
the original choice of b1, so the denominator of (12) is positive. Thus the sign of db1=db2
is that of t2: As in the prior example, if we assume a high distaste for migrants in the own
community, so ￿ > 1, then t2 and strategic interactions may be positive. However, assuming
" < 1, so there are not super scale and substitution e⁄ects, there are a variety of values of ￿
17where strategic interactions are negative. The intuition is straightforward. Rather than a
race to the bottom, if one locality reduces servicing, another may raise servicing in order to
attract more migrants to the whole urban area.
Equations (11) and (11a) will form the basis for tests of strategic interactions in the
fashion of the public ￿nance literature. Implementation is discussed below.
3.5 Extensions
So far we have looked at migrants assuming they are generally low-skilled; and we have
assumed existing residents are high-skilled and immobile. We may have both high-skilled
migrants from outside the urban area and movements of existing high- and low-skilled resi-
dents across localities. While we will estimate overall locality household growth equations
based on equation (7) (or L1 = (y + f)A1 + A1b￿
1 ￿ A1L in the example in Section 3.4
above), we will also separately estimate growth equations for high- and low-skilled house-
holds. We introduce other considerations, such as di⁄ering tastes across localities among
initial residents concerned with inequitable provision of public services as re￿ ected in their
voting preferences. Note the general speci￿cation of preferences of existing residents could
incorporate the idea that migrants may be a ￿scal burden or asset to existing residents of a
locality.
4 Determinants of Locality Infrastructure Servicing and
Land-Use Regulation
In this section we examine how localities choose service levels, focusing on the implementation
of equation (11). There are two initial issues. First, as soon as we move beyond simple
quasi-linear speci￿cations of tastes and technology, the relationships governing b1 will be
highly non-linear, with any locality￿ s strategy interacted with all other localities￿housing
supply attributes and strategies. Second, across urban areas, there are di⁄erent numbers of
localities; this generates di⁄erent forms to the b1 equation. Since there are many localities
in large urban areas, we can have incredibly complex reaction functions as well as dampened
strategic interactions as we move towards perfect competition. These issues plague the entire
literature on estimation of local strategic interactions.
The ad hoc solution in formulating reaction functions is to decide that, for locality 1,
(a) some localities are in more direct competition than others, and (b) rather than explore
heterogeneous responses to other localities, other localities are represented by an index in a








w1jbj is a weighted sum of all other localities￿choices in the urban area. Weights
are typically chosen based on no explicit model. However, in our example in (11a), if we
set ￿ = 1; the model suggests we should weight by a land supply measure, where weights
on competitors￿bj￿ s should increase as supply, Aj, does. We use the inverse of population
density for the locality, as a weight indicating greater availability of land supply. In the
literature (e.g., Case, Rosen, and Hines (1993) and Besley and Case (1995)), most weighting
is based on spatial or economic proximity, in our case within an urban area, which is outside
the speci￿ed model, although the intuition for proximity weighting is that a locality is in
more direct competition with near neighbors. We utilize land supply weights since they
arise in the model, but also discuss results using proximity weights and equal weights within
the urban area.
We note that, while testing for strategic interactions is important, we are most interested
in heterogeneity in the setting of b￿ s, or the role of locality conditions and the estimated ￿
in (13). Writing (13) for all localities, we have
b = ￿W
0b + Z￿ + ", (13a)
where W is the weighting matrix, with zeros for the own locality and for all other localities
not in the same urban area as the own locality. Weights for localities in an urban area (row)
are normalized to sum to 1.
There are several issues in estimation of (13). First, by construction, since "1i in￿ uences
b1i, and since b1i a⁄ects other localities￿choices of bji,
P
j6=1; j2i
w1jbj is correlated with "1.
Thus, OLS estimates are biased. In particular, if reaction functions are negatively [positively]
sloped, a shock which causes one locality to raise its servicing will lead others to reduce [raise]
their servicing. The absolute impact of reactions terms is therefore overstated. There are
several possible solutions. The ￿rst is to use lagged values of covariates (Hayashi and
Boadway (2001)), arguing that " are uncorrelated overtime (especially in a context where
we estimate with urban area ￿xed e⁄ects) and localities react in a lagged fashion to other







w1jZj, if we assume, for example, that time-lagged values of
Z￿ s are exogenous (e.g., Fredriksson and Millimet (2002)). While in Section 5 we are




unacceptably weak (with little impact on results), so we do not use that approach here.
A third solution for endogeneity of the b￿ s is to rewrite (13a) as
b = (I ￿ ￿W)
￿1Z￿ + (I ￿ ￿W)
￿1" (14)
and estimate by maximum likelihood. The problem in estimating (14) is that it ignores
spatial correlation of the error terms, which would arise, for example, from unobserved, cor-
related geographic factors across localities within an urban area that a⁄ect public infrastruc-
ture choices. Ignoring this fact in a speci￿cation like (14) would lead to biased estimates.
Thus, we assume an error structure of the form " = ￿M" + ￿, where ￿ ￿ N(0;￿2I) and M
is a matrix of spatial weights. For this speci￿cation, the estimating model becomes
b = (I ￿ ￿W)
￿1Z￿ + (I ￿ ￿W)
￿1(I ￿ ￿M)
￿1￿. (15)
For the M matrix, we use weights calculated from the inverse distance between pairs of local-
ities in an urban area (normalized to sum to one), which gives greater weight to neighboring
localities. Given urban area ￿xed e⁄ects are included in Z, it is not clear what the sign of
￿ should be. For the Z￿ s, we use lagged covariates to deal with issues of contemporaneous
correlation between errors and covariates; however, policy choices, b, are contemporaneous.
In our case, maximum likelihood estimates of (15) are almost identical to the OLS estimates
using lagged covariates (including lagged
P
j6=1; j2i
w1jbj). Thus, with some degree of comfort,
we will estimate versions of (13) that allow for more sophisticated strategic interactions than
permitted by the linear model upon which (15) is based.
4.1 Results
We examine the determination of service levels for small houses (1￿ 3 rooms) in which mi-
grants are likely to live in 1991 just after democratization, presuming they re￿ ect policy
decisions made in the 1980s under dictatorship. We assume locality elites in the 1980s have
the ability to manipulate servicing of neighborhoods to encourage or discourage in-migration.
We estimate di⁄erent speci￿cations of the model, both econometric and economic. We start
with a base case where we are trying to determine a reasonable robust, econometric speci￿-
cation. Then we turn to di⁄erent economic speci￿cations, allowing for more sophisticated
strategic interactions, and we have a detailed discussion of results. Finally we explore some
counterfactuals.
204.1.1 Base Case
To look at econometric speci￿cations, we start with a base case in Table 4a using a base
set of locality characteristics (the Z￿ s), which are median household income in 1980, number
of urban households in 1980, and the interaction between the two, with these variables all
in logarithmic form. For strategic interactions, we use inverse density weights (for 1980)
in summing opponent localities￿strategic choices of service levels (the b￿ s) within the urban
area, as suggested by the model.10 We also report on other weighting schemes. Column
1 gives OLS estimates of equation (13), where own locality 1991 service levels react to
opponents￿1980 service level choices. Column 4 repeats column 1 except it uses all 1991
covariates. Column 2 estimates the speci￿cation of equation (15) by maximum likelihood.11
Column 2 estimates, as required, use own and opponents￿1991 service levels, given that (15)
in principle solves the endogeneity problem of opponents￿contemporaneous service choices.
To mitigate other endogeneity issues, as in other columns, Column 2 uses 1980 covariates
and inverse density weights. The inverse density weights apply to the W matrix, although
we experiment with alternatives. The M matrix uses inverse distance weights between pairs
of localities within the urban area as would be suggested by notions of spatial correlation.
All speci￿cations have urban area ￿xed e⁄ects, based on the model. Localities in the sample
are at least 50% urbanized (so as to have an urban policy) in the base period.12
We start with an analysis of strategic interactions and estimates of the ￿ coe¢ cient. In
the base linear model, all estimates of strategic interactions are negative. While a race to
the bottom is an element of the model, the interpretation is that, in net, a rise in servicing
in one locality leads other localities to reduce their servicing. The rise elsewhere helps bring
more migrants to the urban area as desired for scale economy reasons, but lowering one￿ s
own servicing de￿ ects these migrants to other localities in the urban area. As we will see
below, we get more nuanced results when using non-linear speci￿cations.
For the magnitude of strategic interactions, the OLS estimate in column 1 is -0.43. The
corresponding OLS estimate in column 4, where we use contemporaneous measures for others￿
policy choices, W0b, shows the hypothesized direction of bias from using contemporaneous
measures. The coe¢ cient vastly overstates the absolute magnitude of strategic interactions.
In column 2, the MLE estimate of ￿ is similar to the OLS estimate, but is absolutely larger
10The choice of inverse density is meant to re￿ ect greater weighting of opponent localities in the urban
area that have more available land for development, and hence where new housing construction is likely to
occur. It is the policies of these localities to which the own locality is most likely to respond.
11We perform the maximum likelihood estimation using James LeSage￿ s econometric toolbox with the
￿sac￿function in Matlab.
12There are also a handful of small localities where the actual number of small houses surveyed are fewer
than 10; we exclude these to avoid noisy numbers on service levels.
21at -0.53. We estimated many versions of the MLE model in column 2, in particular varying
the weighting scheme for the W matrix. Using equal weights within urban areas increased
the absolute value of the ￿ coe¢ cient to -0.69 under OLS and -0.59 under MLE. Using
inverse distance weights for the W matrix yielded insigni￿cant negative ￿￿ s, but there is the
usual MLE problem of robustness and precision when using the same weighting scheme for
both the W and M matrices. Given that both OLS and MLE estimates are sensitive to
the choice of W weights, we rely on the inverse density ones suggested by the model. These
estimates suggest that an increase of 1 percentage point in the weighted average of small
houses serviced in other localities of an urban area leads the own locality to service about
0.45 percentage points fewer small houses than it would otherwise, in order to de￿ ect the
increased number of migrants to the urban area to other localities.
Column 2 results have some particular features. First, the spatial correlation measure for
error terms, ￿, is negative, which may seem surprising, but recall we have urban area ￿xed
e⁄ects. If urban area ￿xed e⁄ects are removed, the spatial correlation in errors becomes
strongly positive. Second, estimates of ￿ are statistically weak here and more generally in
variants of (15). Third, the standard errors of coe¢ cient estimates in column 2 are less than
in column 1, where column 1 allows for within urban area clustering, while column 2 speci￿es
a common form to within urban area spatial correlation. Finally, in comparing column 1 and
2 results, as we will discuss later, the marginal e⁄ects of non-strategic interaction variables
(the Z￿ s) are very close to each other. The results suggest to us that the OLS estimates in
column 1 with lagged covariates are reasonable and close to relevant MLE estimates. Since
we want to allow for more economically interesting strategic interactions than modelled in
(15), we will tend to rely on OLS estimation with lagged covariates. This choice is enforced
by the notion that MLE estimates are criticized in the literature as non-robust in a variety
of circumstances (e.g., Conley (2008)).
Apart from strategic interactions, we are interested in how locality socioeconomics a⁄ects
policy making. We believe that service provision in general is a normal good whose levels
will rise with median locality income. The urban literature hypothesizes that there are scale
economies in public service provision which would lead larger localities to provide services
more cheaply, although such scale e⁄ects may disappear at modest sizes. However, we also
anticipate that larger, richer localities have a stronger strategic incentive to under-service
small houses, as a means of de￿ ecting migrants. They may have a stronger aversion to
congestion or increased population density. Second, richer households may not want the
children of low-income and low-educated migrants in local schools. Lastly, there may be
￿scal reasons, such as the dilution of any property tax base, for richer localities to de￿ ect
low-income migrants. So while we might expect positive income and scale (in terms of
22public service provision) e⁄ects, we expect the interaction between the two to be negative.
All columns in Table 4a show positive income and scale e⁄ects, with a negative interaction
term, as hypothesized.
What do the results in Table 4a suggest about locality preferences towards servicing of
houses potentially occupied by low-income and low-educated migrants? Based on either
column 1 or 2 in Table 4a, coe¢ cients indicate that for localities at 1.5 standard deviations
below mean income (at 8.9), a 3 standard deviation increase in size (4.2) increases servicing
by about 0.14 or 14 percentage points (from a mean of 0.77), while at 1.5 standard deviations
above mean income (10.1), the scale e⁄ect is close to 0 (0￿ 0.03).13 Similarly, at 1.5 standard
deviations below mean size (at 7.2), a 3 standard deviation increase in income (1.2) increases
servicing by just over 0.25 or 25 percentage points, while at 1.5 standard deviations above
mean size (11.4), the scale e⁄ect is under 0.15. Table 4b explores this negative income-scale
interaction further. Based on the Table 4a column 1 speci￿cation, we divide localities into
separate size and income quintiles and then interact these, creating 24 cells relative to the
base. As Table 4b shows, income and size e⁄ects both rise monotonically across quintiles.
All interactive e⁄ects are statistically insigni￿cant and not reported in the table except for
the highest income quintile in the 4th and 5th size quintiles. These interactive e⁄ects are
large, strongly diminishing the scale and income e⁄ects. So moving from the lowest income
and size quintiles to the highest, ignoring interaction, raises servicing by 0.48 (48 percentage
points); the interaction reduces that increase by 0.16.
Finally in Table 4a, column 3, we add covariates in￿ uencing locality choices to the column
1 speci￿cation. One represents ￿preferences￿for more egalitarian policies, taken as the share
of voting in the locality in favor of anti-military political parties in the 1982 elections for
representatives to the national legislature. This is intended to be a measure of preferences
for more ￿leftist￿representatives who might be more egalitarian (as revealed by actions in
the subsequent democratic era). This indeed is associated with increased servicing. Higher
own locality density also appears to increase servicing, which is intuitive since greater den-
sity would entail stronger negative externalities from poor water and sanitation conditions.
These additional variables have little impact on the marginal e⁄ects of other covariates and
we do not carry them through in other speci￿cations that explore strategic choices in more
detail.
13For example, the 0.14 number comes from (0.265-0.0261￿8.9)￿4.2
234.1.2 Locality Policy Setting
The evaluations and the linear model in the base case impose three key assumptions. First,
strategic interactions are modeled as having the same form, regardless of how many localities
there are in each urban area and how many competitors or opponents a locality faces. This
is not what economic theory tells us. Second, interactions are linear, allowing, for example,
for no interaction between what di⁄erent competitors do. Third, the in￿ uence of the W0b
variable does not vary by locality characteristics￿ high-income and low-income localities
react to other localities￿strategic choices in the same fashion. We now explore an example
in the data where we can relax these assumptions easily. We have 10 urban areas with 2
localities each and 13 with 3. Beyond that, we have a more limited sample of urban areas
with speci￿c numbers of localities: for example, there are 5 urban areas with 4 localities
and there are a number of single urban areas with anywhere from 12 to 34 localities. So
we experiment with the 2￿ 3 locality urban area sample. We need a su¢ cient number of
urban areas with any speci￿c number of localities to distinguish e⁄ects by number of actors.
Moreover, the interactive terms of strategic choices escalates with the number of actors.
We look at the sample of 23 urban areas that have either 2 or 3 localities. For the
base speci￿cation, we have just W0b for 2 locality urban areas, since each locality interacts
with just one other (and W0b is just the other locality￿ s choice). For 3 locality urban
areas, we have W0b (which will now be a weighted average of the 2 opponents choices),
but we allow the slope coe¢ cient to di⁄er since there are more players. In addition, for
3 locality urban areas, for each locality j we interact wkbk with wlbl to allow interactive
e⁄ects. After estimating this speci￿cation of strategic interactions, we explore interacting
opponents￿policy choice variables with own locality variables, in particular income, to see if
high- versus low-income localities respond di⁄erently to opponents￿choices.
Results for the restricted sample are in Table 5. Column 1 of Table 5 repeats the speci-
￿cation of column 1 in Table 4a. Results are similar, although for this smaller sample, the
point estimate for strategic interactions is larger in absolute magnitude and the coe¢ cients
on the Z ￿ s have sharper marginal e⁄ects. In column 2, we add in the new strategic choice
variables. The one allowing 3 locality urban areas to have a di⁄erent slope to W0b is nega-
tive but insigni￿cant. More interestingly, the wkbk￿wlbl interaction term is strongly negative,
indicating that in 3 locality urban areas, localities respond to the interaction of opponent￿ s
choices. If both opponents raise their service levels, which helps attract more migrants to
the urban area, that allows the own locality to de￿ ect these migrants to the other localities
by further lowering its own service levels.
Column 3 then interacts both the W0b and the wkbk ￿ wlbl terms with locality income.
24There are three basic results. First, while the basic strategic interaction term W0b is
negative throughout relevant income ranges (maximum income is below 10.6 in 1980), the
negative strategic interactions decline sharply with income. That is, as other localities lower
servicing, a richer locality raises its own service levels (to try to attract migrants to the
urban area) by less than a poorer locality. Second, while the wkbk ￿ wlbl e⁄ect is negative
over all income ranges (minimum income is above 8.2 in 1980), the negative reaction to
enhanced servicing in both opponent localities is more muted as income rises. In general,
richer localities are reacting less than poorer localities to others￿choices. This means that
in the net e⁄ect of reacting to others￿choices￿ re￿ ecting the trade-o⁄ between a race to the
bottom (positive coe¢ cient) versus attracting migrants to the urban area to enhance scale
economy e⁄ects (negative coe¢ cient)￿ the race to the bottom plays a more important role
as income rises.
The ￿nal result is that, more generally, larger and richer localities display a strong ten-
dency to under-service small houses. For example, in contrast to the results in Table 4,
the column 3 estimates of Table 5 suggest marginal income and scale e⁄ects do not just
decline with increases in income and scale, but become distinctly negative in larger and
richer localities. To see this, we set W0b and wkbk ￿ wlbl at their averages for the relevant
set of urban areas (0.303 for all localities for W0b and 0.236 for 39 localities in urban areas
with 3 localities for wkbk ￿ wlbl ). Then marginal income e⁄ects are [(0.932 +0.588￿0.303-
0.569￿0.236) - 0.0982￿ln(# urban households)]; these income e⁄ects become negative by 0.5
standard deviations above mean size (10.0). Similarly, in this context, marginal scale e⁄ects
are negative by one standard deviation above mean income. This suggests strong evidence
of exclusionary behavior by localities that are both rich and large.
4.1.3 Robustness and Counterfactuals
Our localities are not always stand-alone municipalities, but are instead combinations of
these political units. Over half of multi-municipality localities in our sample have over 85%
of their urban population in the dominant municipality. We did rerun the basic models in
Table 4 dropping the 25 localities where the dominant municipality had less than 65% of the
urban locality population. There is almost no change in results, and we don￿ t report them.
For counterfactuals, if we are correct about the nature of strategic interactions and incen-
tives to de￿ ect low-income migrants, then we should not see these e⁄ects in two situations.
First, such modeling should not apply to servicing of large houses, which do not cater to low-
income migrants, if we presume localities have no desire to de￿ ect the rich. Higher-income
households are generally well-served. For those without a central water connection, higher
25income households can a⁄ord excellent private alternatives (deep wells, good ￿ltering, and
delivered water). The second situation is that, with democratization, the populist national
government embarked on a wide-spread policy to upgrade slums and their servicing. Thus
by 2000, we would expect to see much weaker e⁄ects. As Table 6 shows, there are no strate-
gic nor income and scale interactions in servicing of large houses in 1991 and also none for
small houses by 2000, based on the column 1, Table 4a formulation. Second, for the formu-
lations (not reported) corresponding to those in column 2 Table 4a and in Table 5, income
and size e⁄ects and their negative interactions are insigni￿cant in both cases. For strategic
interactions per se, there is no evidence of strategic interactions for the Table 5 formulation
for 1991 large houses and limited evidence for 2000 small houses.14 For the equation (15)
model of column 2 Table 4a, while no income nor scale e⁄ects are present, there is evidence
of strategic interactions for both counterfactuals. Nevertheless, we conclude that the OLS
results are more compelling and that localities are not attempting to de￿ ect high-income
households in 1991 nor low-income households in 2000.
5 E⁄ect of Service Provision on Locality Growth and
Population Composition
We now turn to the e⁄ect of servicing decisions on locality population growth as presumably
fueled by in-migration to the urban area. The speci￿cation is based on a linear version of
equation (7), with urban area ￿xed e⁄ects. Controls such as total migrants to the urban
area, local servicing standards, and urban area wages are swept into the ￿xed e⁄ect. What
we then estimate is the within urban area allocation of migrants across localities. The basic
estimating equation is
dln(Li;t) = ￿Ai;t￿1 + ￿bi;t￿1 + "i;t. (7a)
We look at local population growth between 1991 and 2000 as a function of locality char-
acteristics in 1991. From equation (7) these include the level of servicing of small houses,
bi;t￿1, and a set of covariates, Ai;t￿1, which describe housing supply conditions in the locality.
A key issue in estimation concerns the error structure. The urban growth literature
(e.g., Glaeser, Scheinkman, and Shleifer (1995)) often takes the stance that (1) covariates
are pre-determined and not a⁄ected by contemporaneous shocks that might induce growth,
and (2) by looking at a growth equation, we have already di⁄erenced out time-invariant
14Only the W0b term in column 1 of Table 5 is signi￿cant for small houses in 2000. In other columns, all
coe¢ cients are completely insigni￿cant.
26variables that a⁄ect long-run size. As such, in the literature, one standard approach is to
rely on OLS estimation of cross-sectional growth equations. However, it seems likely that
there are omitted variables a⁄ecting growth and persisting su¢ ciently over time. Thus, the
"i;t￿1, which a⁄ected past growth, and the evolution of the predetermined covariates may be
correlated with "i;t. Of greatest concern is the regulatory variable itself. Service supply
today may be a⁄ected by past locality servicing, given bottlenecks in capacity expansion.
Thus, low supply in 1991 may represent unmeasured good growth conditions from 1980￿
1991 for the locality, which caused a back-log in supply, and such growth conditions may
persist into the 1990s. That is, high past growth is negatively correlated with current
supply of water connections. Such in￿ uences will bias the estimated coe¢ cient downward,
understating the positive e⁄ects of good servicing on encouraging migration per se. The
same issue relates to housing supply conditions￿ good unobservables driving locality growth
in the past in￿ uence current housing supply conditions.
We focus on locality growth from 1991-2000. This last interval in the census data allows
us to separate Brazil￿ s initial rapid industrialization and urbanization that occurs after World
War II and extends into the 1980s from today￿ s modern economy. By 1991, Brazil is 75%
urbanized. The axis of industrialization that had focused on Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro in
the southeast of Brazil expands with substantial and on-going industrialization of hinterland
cities and more rapid growth in the Northeast region. The drivers of local growth have
changed with the development of new export markets and development of new agricultural
crops for export, as well as the move from heavy industry based on state capitalism to lighter
industry based on manufacture of consumer products (da Mata, Deichmann, Henderson,
Lall, and Wang (2005)). This change in economic regimes will be part of an identi￿cation
strategy. Despite the high level of 1991 urbanization, there remains on-going migration, as
well as population growth. In our sample, the number of urban households grew by 40%
from 1991-2000. We look for growth e⁄ects in the democratic era to see if poor servicing in
1991, which arose in the non-democratic 1980s, a⁄ects growth from 1991-2000.
5.1 Instruments
We need to instrument for two types of variables. First is the service variable and second
are housing supply conditions in the locality.
5.1.1 Extent of Servicing
For water supply, we turn to geological variables, which a⁄ected historical private water
supply in the form of wells. Geology in￿ uenced historical locality policies as to whether
27to invest heavily in central water provision, even without exclusionary considerations. As
water tables for wells have become strained, migrants at the margin without a central con-
nection must obtain water by hauling from stand pipes or purchasing it privately (trucks,
bags, bottles). What drove historical decisions about the extent of use of private wells?
If underlying sediments and rocks in a locality are more porous, they retain more water
and wells are a more viable alternative to a public water connection. Second, insolation
a⁄ects the rate and variability of underground water replenishment, again a key issue in the
viability of wells. Insolation is a measure re￿ ecting the amount and intensity of sunlight
reaching the earth￿ s surface. High insolation is associated with less rainfall and more evap-
oration, impeding ground water replenishment. A high variance over the year in insolation
means there are more intense periods of water replenishment without evaporation. While
insolation does vary across localities in an urban area, the fraction of the locality area having
porous rocks and sediment varies much more. Our key instruments for small houses served
with a central water connection are porous geology (reducing the need for servicing, histor-
ically), porous geology interacted with mean insolation (increasing the need for servicing),
and porous geology interacted with the standard deviation of insolation (reducing the need
for servicing). Column 1 in Table B2 contains ￿rst-stage regressions, which show that these
are strong instruments for servicing, with the expected e⁄ects.
We are using these geology variables to instrument for the externality variable: the extent
of locality servicing as driven by historical conditions for getting good water service from
private wells. An issue is whether these variables meet the exclusion restriction. The
concern is that these variables could also be correlated with the unobserved cost of private
alternatives today. We think the cost at the margin for private alternatives today is not
associated with historical conditions for wells; rather, the cost at the margin is the cost of
hauling water from stand pipes or purchasing it from water delivery trucks and stores. We
discuss experiments with other instruments below.
5.1.2 Housing Supply Conditions
The other instruments are for variables relating to housing supply conditions, which, con-
trolling for land, are the number of urban households, average education (in￿ uencing the
demand for space), and the share of households that are rural in the locality (in￿ uencing
the potential supply of higher density urban housing). The main instrumental variables
strategy is based on two notions. First, unobservables that a⁄ected urban area and locality
growth in the past are di⁄erent from unobservables a⁄ecting growth today, so error draw-
ings from 1970 are uncorrelated with drawings in the 1990s. Within urban areas, locality
28economic bases have changed (an unobservable not captured in (7)), as has the urban area
labor market demand for the skill sets of households living in di⁄erent localities. In addition,
with economic development, there has been decentralization of economic activity within ur-
ban areas as well as to hinterland cities. The second notion is that past drawings a⁄ected
housing and other irreversible investment decisions as well as locality population educational
composition in the past. Historical accumulations are relevant since any adjustments away
from them in locality characteristics are slow, so historical variables are strong instruments
for 1991 covariates. If, in the 1960s, a locality attracted low-educated migrants who settled
in dense neighborhoods in the locality, that in￿ uences current educational composition even
if locality economic conditions have changed completely.
Use of historical instruments faces issues. There is a tension between going further back
in time to break the persistence in relevant unobservables and weakening the strength of
instruments. Apart from speci￿cation tests, it is di¢ cult to prove that the assumptions
are correct￿ i.e., this is at best a very limited version of a ￿natural experiment￿ . In our
work, it was clear that instruments from 1970 give much better speci￿cation test results for
the 1991-2000 period, compared to the 1980-1991 time period, one reason why we focus on
the latter time period for population growth equations. For instruments, we draw from the
following either using these variables on their own or interacted with other instruments: (1)
access of a locality to Sao Paulo markets, which played a critical role historically, before
the development of modern trans-national transportation systems even though today it has
little impact on growth;15 (2) the illiteracy rate among the adult population in the locality
and the rest of the urban area in 1970, which in￿ uences, through accumulation, the average
educational attainment today; (3) the manufacturing-to-service ratio in the rest of the urban
area in 1970, which helped urban area economic attainment at the time and in￿ uences local
economic composition today; (5) the number of households in the rest of the urban area,
which gives a historical size measure in￿ uencing urban size today; and (6) the share of the
rest of the locality households that were rural in 1970 and would be a basis for urban growth
and later size. Note the attempt to generally rely on characteristics of localities in the
rest of the urban area￿ i.e., in localities other than the own locality￿ in order to mitigate
problems of persistence of own locality unobservables. Combined with the geology variables,
we experiment below with shorter and longer instrument lists.
15We experimented with replacing distance to Sao Paulo with latitude. Results are very similar, but spec-
i￿cation tests favored the original set of instruments (both on strength and on orthogonality of instruments
to error terms).
295.2 E⁄ects of Servicing on Growth of Urban Households
Table 7 contains the basic results. Columns 1 and 2 contain OLS estimates, with shorter and
longer lists of covariates. Columns 3 and 4 report 2SLS and LIML estimates for the preferred
instrumental variables speci￿cation with a shorter covariate list. Column 5 shows that the
variables omitted from the longer covariate list have zero coe¢ cients in instrumental variables
estimation. Column 6 repeats the column 4 LIML estimation with a shorter instrument list
(designed for the shorter list of covariates); the corresponding 2SLS estimation for column 3
leaves coe¢ cients unchanged.
5.2.1 Servicing
In OLS estimation, the coe¢ cient on servicing is strongly negative and signi￿cant, re￿ ecting
the anticipated bias. Localities subject to the strong growth shocks of the late 1980s have
poor servicing, potentially because of capacity expansion problems. Instrumental variables
estimation takes this strongly negative coe¢ cient and reverses its sign, making it positive.
This positive coe¢ cient is large. For a point estimate of 0.8, a one standard deviation
(0.21) increase in servicing leads to an increase of 0.17 (for which the mean is 0.40) in the
growth rate in the number of households during the decade. This is a basic result of the
paper￿ poor servicing of small houses likely to be occupied by low-income and low-educated
migrants has strong negative locality growth e⁄ects. Water supply reduction in order to
strategically retard locality growth below what it would have been in the absence of such
choices is e⁄ective.
However, the coe¢ cient is somewhat noisily estimated, always signi￿cant at the 10%
level but not quite at the 5% level (noting error terms are robust to heteroskedasticity and
clustered at the urban area level). The partial F on the ￿rst stage regression for service levels
is around 13. In a context where we are instrumenting for multiple interrelated variables
including urban area ￿xed e⁄ects, this means instruments are not that strong. The LIML
coe¢ cients estimated to account for weaker instruments are generally larger, and in column
4 the coe¢ cient is signi￿cant at just over the 5% level. However, LIML is more sensitive to
the length of the instrument list, as column 6 reveals. The shorter instrument list brings
the LIML coe¢ cient more in line with the 2SLS estimates. For 2SLS, the 0.74 coe¢ cient
in column 3 is stable at 0.77 when estimated with the shorter instrument list in column 6.
An issue discussed above with our geology instruments for private supply conditions is
whether they meet the exclusion restriction. Our problem is that with urban area ￿xed
e⁄ects, we only have alternative instruments that are substantially weaker and perform
poorly on under-identi￿cation tests. We experimented with a weaker instrument list for
30servicing representing the costs of public provision (of no concern to the marginal unserviced
migrant). Public supply often historically came from rivers. We instrument with whether
the locality has a river, using that to replace the porous geology variable in the instrument
list (including the interaction with insolation), and add in the altitude of the locality relative
to the river (which captures the costs associated with pumping water upwards). The 2SLS
coe¢ cient on the extent of servicing is unchanged at 0.78. Of course, we must recognize that
the existence of a river could also a⁄ect private supply costs. Removal of the porous geology
and weather (insolation) variables as instruments leaves just locality historical political and
economic conditions, which are weak instruments. The service variable coe¢ cient does
change from negative to positive, but the estimated coe¢ cient is smaller and insigni￿cant.
We perform two robustness checks for the growth equation. First, we reestimate the
model in columns 3￿ 6 of Table 7, dropping the 25 localities in which there are multiple
municipalities where the dominant municipality has less than 65% of the locality urban
population. Results are the same as in Table 7, so the inclusion of these localities has
no impact on results. Second, as a service variable, we used the share of houses without
land title that have a central water connection. We did not perform this same robustness
check for strategic interactions because we lack 1980 data for this covariate. For the growth
model, our instruments for the service variable are weak. The best case involves the short
instrument list used in column 6 of Table 7, where the ￿rst-stage partial F-statistic for the
service variable is 6.2. For this speci￿cation, the OLS coe¢ cient of -0.16 becomes 1.82 under
LIML but the standard error is 2.22.
5.2.2 Housing Supply Conditions
In Table 6, the basic controls on housing supply are land area and the number of households￿
controls for density of overall development. Again, the biases in moving from OLS to
instrumental variables estimation are what we expect. A high number of households is
associated with recent strong local shocks and on-going growth, understating the negative
e⁄ect of crowding on future housing supply conditions. So an OLS coe¢ cient in column 1 of
-0.03 becomes -0.12 to -0.15 under instrumental variables estimation. Additional variables
with OLS e⁄ects such as education (reducing supply) or share rural (increasing supply) have
zero coe¢ cients under instrumental variables estimation.
5.3 Composition E⁄ects
So far we have looked at how under-servicing leads to a decline in overall in-migration.
Because it is aimed at small houses, under-servicing also acts to discourage in-migration of
31lower-income residents from other parts of the urban area as well as of new arrivals to the
urban area. Thus, we should see under-servicing negatively a⁄ecting the growth of lower-
income households in a locality, which we represent by education level of the household head.
We use education rather than income to better represent permanent socioeconomic status.
We de￿ne two groups: households where the household head has not completed primary
school, which is about 50% of the population in 2000, and those who have primary school
or more. While we expect that poor servicing of small houses will a⁄ect growth of low-
education households in a locality, there is the possibility it will also detract from growth of
higher-education households. In the modeling in equation (9), we postulate that servicing
of migrants is a positive externality for initial residents. Thus, we separately look at the
e⁄ect of servicing small houses on growth of higher-education households.
The basic speci￿cations are in Table 8. For housing supply, we control for base period
overall density and household count of the relevant group whose growth we are investi-
gating. Columns 1￿ 3 deal with low-education household growth and columns 4￿ 6 with
higher-education household growth. Column 1 gives OLS estimates and columns 2 and 3
give 2SLS and LIML estimates. The deterrent e⁄ects of higher density and own group size
are strengthened in moving from OLS to instrumental variables estimation as expected.
The focus is on the servicing of small houses. As expected, and as in the overall growth
estimation, OLS coe¢ cients for this variable are negative. In instrumental variables esti-
mation, the service coe¢ cient for the growth of low-education households is positive, very
large, and now signi￿cant. A one standard deviation reduction in servicing (0.21) reduces
the growth of low-education households by 0.17 for 2SLS, with even bigger e⁄ects for LIML
estimation.
For high-education households between 1991 and 2000, under instrumental variables es-
timation, the coe¢ cient for servicing of small houses is also large, positive, and almost the
same in magnitude as for low-education households. The estimate is somewhat noisier, being
signi￿cant at just over the 5% level. Including a control for servicing of large houses occu-
pied by high-education households (not shown), leaves other results unchanged and yields
an insigni￿cant coe¢ cient on the large-house variable. When we estimate a ratio model
(also not shown), where the ratio is the growth rate of low- relative to high-education house-
holds,16 the coe¢ cient on servicing is zero. Both that and the results in columns 2￿ 3 and
16This ratio represents a form of di⁄erencing. We e⁄ectively di⁄erence what would be the separate






where k = L;H. This has the advantage of di⁄erencing out location observables and unobservables whose
e⁄ects are common to both groups. Where ￿ represents any di⁄erential in slope coe¢ cient between low and
higher education households, the estimating equation is then dln(NL
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325￿ 6 suggest that poor servicing of small houses has adverse e⁄ects on growth of all education
households, suggesting a strong negative externality for higher-education households.
6 Conclusions
While there is an extensive literature on the exclusionary policies of local jurisdictions (see
Epple and Nechyba (2004) and Gyourko, Mayer, and Sinai (2006)), it has tended to focus
on the exclusionary policies of localities in developed economies, where informal housing
markets do not exist. We have attempted, in our work, to examine exclusionary policies
in a developing country framework where informal markets not only exist but are relatively
prevalent, and thus provide an alternative to formal housing markets when localities attempt
to enact exclusionary housing restrictions. In such a scenario, whatever legal housing re-
strictions are in place, migrants can still enter into the informal housing market. Beyond
enacting legal restrictions, localities can deny public infrastructure services such as water
and sanitation to the informal housing sector and thereby create a disincentive for migrants
to enter.
We have examined these migration and exclusion dynamics using a sample of 447 localities
in 123 urban areas in Brazil between 1980 and 2000. These urban areas face exogenous
employment shocks that attract migrants to the urban area, and migrants then make a
decision of the locality in which to reside within the urban area. Localities themselves,
however, may wish to limit population growth especially when migrants tend to be poor
and low-educated. In the Brazilian context, demolishing informal housing is politically
infeasible and there has been no recorded episode of such demolition since the early 1900s.
Thus, localities make living conditions in the informal housing sector unpleasant as a means
of de￿ ecting migrants to other localities in the urban area.
We estimate the determinants of water provision to the types of houses in which the poor
and low-educated primarily live (i.e., 1￿ 3 room houses in 1991). We ￿nd evidence of strate-
gic interactions￿ that localities adjust their service provision in response to corresponding
policies in other localities of the urban area. We also ￿nd that richer localities provide more
servicing (a wealth e⁄ect), larger localities provide more servicing (a scale e⁄ect), but being
both rich and large is associated with reduced servicing, with the reductions in servicing
dominating at the high-income end. Similarly, there is some evidence that richer localities
are more likely to engage in a strategic race to the bottom.
We then estimate the e⁄ect of under-servicing small houses on locality population growth
and composition. The ￿ndings suggest that under-servicing small houses leads to slower
33growth in locality size. This slowed growth arises from both slower growth of low-educated
households and slower growth of high-educated households. The implication is that ex-
ternalities from under-servicing small houses are detrimental to attracting higher-educated
households as well as to attracting lower-educated households to slum neighborhoods.
In sum, this paper provides evidence of intentional, strategic exclusion as an explanation
for the existence of unserviced housing sectors (slums) in localities that have su¢ cient wealth
and scale to provide basic infrastructure services to all houses in their jurisdiction. This
intentional exclusion reduces locality population growth and alters its composition. De￿ ect-
ing poor and low-educated households by making living conditions for them unpleasant also
de￿ ects the wealthy and high-educated households to localities where they do not confront
the negative externalities of living near unserviced slums. Future research should focus on
the e⁄ects of this intentional exclusion on social outcomes and economic growth of urban
areas.
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363738394041424344Appendix A: Rent Hedonics
Hedonic regressions to determine ￿shadow prices￿ or consumer willingness-to-pay for at-
tributes apply to speci￿c markets. Each locality has its own housing market, so in principle
rent regressions to obtain consumer willingness-to-pay for housing and neighborhood at-
tributes should be run separately for each locality. We look at Sao Paulo and Rio de
Janeiro municipalities in 1980. We do not have data on house prices, but we do have data
on rental units, most of which are houses (rather than apartments). In the hedonic equa-
tions, we control for a variety of basic house characteristics: number of bedrooms, number
of other rooms, urban versus rural location in the municipality, 6 types of wall construction
materials, 7 types of ￿ oors, 8 types of roofs, and whether the unit is a single family residence.
We then control for a variety of servicing features. The identi￿cation issue in estimation
is that there may be unobserved neighborhood attributes that are correlated with servicing
or even house attributes. To try to minimize this problem, we insert district level ￿xed
e⁄ects, where Sao Paulo has 56 and Rio de Janeiro has 24 districts. The most recent year
for which we can do this is 1980￿ later years either do not have rent data or do not have
district identi￿ers.
For services, we do a full examination of all types and forms of services and then a reduced
form where we use the typical summary measures￿ central water connection and full service
(any electricity, central sewer, and connection to central piped water). In part, choices for
the summary variables are driven by what data are available across census years. Table A1
shows the basic results.
In Table A1, the reported coe¢ cients re￿ ect the percent by which rents rise. From
columns 1 and 3, it is clear that in both Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, there is a high
premium on having central water piped into the house: substantially more than well water
piped into the house, presumably re￿ ecting the greater reliability of supply. Electricity
garners a very large premium, even more so if it is metered (legal), indicating both reliable
supply and higher (amperage) e⁄ective service. Public garbage collection has modest or
no impacts. Central sewer is much more valued than septic systems, especially in Rio de
Janeiro. Septic systems only raise premiums modestly above having no service, presumably
re￿ ecting the failure of septic systems in these dense localities. Clearly, there could be
neighborhood conditions that vary within districts, but the results are suggestive.
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